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12 December 1951

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Projected 1952 OPC and OSO Operations in Albania

1. [] of OSO met with [] and [] of OPC on December 6 to exchange views on 1952 operations and to outline the operational plan each office expects to adopt. [] opened the discussion by stating that OPC plans for 1952 have not been finalized as yet. Clarification of our plans awaits State Department and Foreign Office reaction to proposals now before them. The scope and type of operations OPC will mount, will be determined by the reaction of State and the Foreign Office. Generally speaking, however, OPC plans two specific types of operation. On the one hand, our aim is establishment of nets built around high level agents for neutralisation of the Albanian armed forces by penetration of army and government circles. Naturally, a corollary of this penetration operation is the development of dormant resistance potential. On the other hand, OPC expects to mount several coup de main operations against certain selected targets. These operations will definitely not involve personnel connected with the penetration operation, and these activities will be planned so as not to endanger any other existing nets. In addition, these operations, which our propaganda campaign expects to exploit, will be planned so as not to cause reprisals on the civilian population.

2. In respect to OSO operations, [] expressed the familiar viewpoint that 1951 operations were disappointing, and no service could expect to any longer receive the outright support and cooperation of the Albanian people in the face of the reprisal measures adopted by the Sigarini. With that thought in mind, [] explained that OSO had decided to limit their operations in 1952. However, the requirements of their "customers" demanded continuation of operations to fulfill certain specific objectives:

a. OSO must maintain intelligence coverage to keep informed of Russian intentions in Albania, and keep up-to-date on day to day developments within the country.

b. OSO must also keep track of Yugoslav intentions and activities in respect to Albania. [] considered the present Yugoslav attitude a very dangerous element in the overall Balkan picture, which the U.S. State Department had not as yet acknowledged.

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e. OSO also believes they have the additional responsibility of supporting OPC activities as the need arises. Specifically, OSO is holding certain assets which may be advantageously used in support of our operations.

3. To accomplish its 1952 program [] provided an outline of the operations presently being planned:

a. An operation will be mounted to contact the League of the Mountains in Northern Albania, assess their strength and forward information to headquarters so that a decision may be reached regarding NCFA contact with this resistance group. It is planned to contact the League of the Mountains by sending a small team overland from Greece via Yugoslavia with a W/T set.

b. To establish Yugoslav listening posts, OSO expects to mount two separate operations. One, composed of Kossovars, will move overland from Greece to the area between Skoplje and the Albanian border. The other, made up of members of the EKI, will be dropped in Northern Albania and then move across the Yugoslav frontier to the Prizren area.

c. A limited operation is planned in the Southwestern corner of Albania. A small team has recently returned from the Delvine area, and OSO felt they showed particular promise. Consequently, several members are presently learning W/T, and the team will be re-infiltrated in 1952.

d. OSO plans to continue its THUNDERSTORM operation which is handled by Greek intelligence. This operation is directed against South Central Albania, and may penetrate as far north as Elbasan. I questioned [] about the thinking behind this operation, and he explained that OSO thought it was preferable to control the operation by supporting the Greeks financially rather than allowing them to go their own way and run the risk of not keeping control on Greek activities in this area.

e. OSO plans to continue its efforts to defect certain legation personnel in Paris and Rome. The Komitsa operation is an example of the OSO defection program.

4. Several other matters of mutual interest were brought to our attention by []. He requested a statement to the effect air operations would be deemphasized in 1952. [] indicated we did not expect to use the covert plane to the same extent we did in 1951 for body drops. [] raised the question of joint use of the Guard Company, and mentioned that OSO would like to have a place to hold a small number of operationally useful individuals. This point had been covered in the discussion of the previous day, and was generally agreed to, although OPC reserves the right to limit the number of OSO

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men assigned to the Guard Company. [] mentioned that radio London was guilty of sowing unnecessary discord among the various Albanian refugee groups. A certain Tahir Zavali, an ex-communist, heads the Albanian desk of BBC, and does more harm than good according to [] I agreed to look into this, and expressed concern over the lack of coordination in the torrent of propaganda directed against Albania.

5. Both [] and [] thanked [] for his detailed presentation and promised to properly brief [] on the details of our plans as they develop.

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